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BURGER-FISCHER V. DEGUSSA AG: U.S. COURTS ALLOW SIEMENS
AND DEGUSSA TO PROFIT FROM HOLOCAUST SLAVE LABOR
Kara C. Ryf*
"Contrary to the arrogantly expressed position ... of the
representatives of German industry, these are claims that are not and
cannot be barred by time or technicality. These are claims which are
not requests for charity, for voluntary gestures of good will or for
humanitarian assistance for the needy ... The claims asserted.. .are
founded on the historical fact that slave and forced laborers were
called and treated by the German economy as "beasts, barbarians
and subhumans" solely because of who they were in a bizarre and
distorted scale of racial hierarchy .... These offenses violated the
most basic elements of universal legal norms."1
INTRODUCTION
Zelig Preis was only eighteen-years-old when he was forced to2
work as a slave laborer for Siemens, Germany's largest electronics and
communications manufacturer.3 Siemens acquired Preis and thousands of
other laborers from Nazi concentration camps to assist in the company's
production of war-related equipment.4 Siemens subjected its laborers to the
B.S., with distinction, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1997); J.D. Candidate, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law (2001); Contributing Editor, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law. I would like to thank Professor Hiram Chodosh for
his guidance and suggestions on this piece; and Emily Corse for her time, patience and
dedication in developing my writing skills.
1 Michael Hausfeld, Remarks at Washington D.C. Conference on Slave and Forced
Labor (May 12, 1999) (transcript available at Cohen Milstein - In the News (visited Sept.
29, 2000) <http://www.cmht.com/ipMDHspeech.htm>). Hausfeld was one of the lawyers
that represented plaintiffs in Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG.
2 See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253 (D.N.J. 1999).
3 See BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAvES: JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND THE
QUEST FOR COMPENSATION 117 (1979).
4 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 262-63; see also Weekend All Things
Considered, (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 6, 1998); FERENcz, supra note 3, at 24.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
most detestable living and working conditions imaginable.5 They slept in
wooden bunks with three others in a barracks lacking heat, light, water,
sewage facilities, and protection from the rain.6 Preis was awakened at 5:00
a.m. and forced to walk six miles to a construction site where he labored ten
to twelve hours a day under the constant threat of being beaten, executed, or
taken to the gas chambers at Auschwitz.7
Preis' story is representative of close to 100,000 slave laborers
employed by Siemens during the Holocaust8 and of approximately eight to
ten million people who were forced to work for industries throughout
Germany during the war.9 An arrangement with the Nazi government
allowed companies to reap the benefits of drawing on a large labor pool'0
without cost. Because most Germans were engaged in fighting the war"
and concentration camp inmates were not paid,' these companies were able
to profit and emerge from the war as successful corporations. As a direct
result of these atrocities many corporations such as BMW, Siemens,
Volkswagen and DaimlerChrysler largely avoided the economic
devastation plaguing most of postwar Germany. 3
5 See FERENCZ, supra note 3, at 117 (stating that in 1946 Hermann von Siemens
articulated that camp inmates were happy to have the opportunity to work at Siemens and
that if people were not adequately fed or mistreated he was not aware).
6 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
7 Seeid.
8 See id. at 254.
9 See Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 601, 612
(1999); see also Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in
United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 193 n. 789 (2000) ("The number of companies
which used salve labor exceeded 20,000. According to Ulrich Herbert, the foremost expert
on the subject, there wasn't a company in Germany with more than 10 employees which
didn't use slave or forced labor. There were also many with fewer than 10 employees which
did. There were even numerous households with slave laborers as maids and butlers."). For
a complete list of German Firms that employed slave laborers, see Cohen, Milstein,
Hansfield & Toll's e-journal, Forced Labor Atrocities (visited Oct. 9, 2000)
<http://www.cmht.comlslavelabor/ companies.htm>.
10 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F.Supp. 2d at 253.
" See id. at 263.
12 See id. at 253-54.
13 See id. at 271; see also Senator Tom Hayden, Ex-slave Laborers Deserve Far Better;
Rich Firms Get Good Press with Token Payments, but What About the Victims? L.A. TIMEs,
Dec. 30, 1999 at 11 (giving an example of how companies that exploited slave laborers, such
as BMW, Volkswagen, Seimens and DaimlerChrysler, have maintained respectable
corporate images).
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Over the past fifty years German industries have paid only nominal
amounts to slave labor victims, 14 and most victims have not received any
compensation. 15 Finally, in an effort to compensate the 700,000 to 1.6
million slave labor survivors, 16 negotiations to design a settlement fund
began in early 1999 between eight nations. 7 The parties involved included
the United States, Germany, representatives from German industry, class
action lawyers and Jewish organizations. On December 14, 1999, the
parties agreed to establish 8 the Initiative for Responsibility, Remembrance
and the Future, compensation fund.' 9 The fund, signed on July 17, 2000,
will provide close to one million former slave laborers, victims of
confiscated property, and persons wrongly denied insurance claims, with
$4.8 billion) °
Forced labor survivors including Zelig Preis and the other plaintiffs
in the class action law suit Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG,2' will receive
less than $5,000 each from this fund.22 The settlement absolves all
14 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 271; see also FERENCZ, supra note 3, at 209-11
(depicting in chart format the number of claimants paid per country by Siemens, I.G.
Frarben, Krupp, A.E.G. and Rheinmetall).
15 See FERENCZ, supra note 3, at 127.
16 See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 613. See also William Drozdiak, Holocaust Survivors
Face Delay in Compensation Victims, German Firms Break Off Negotiations, WASH. POST,
Aug. 27, 1999, at A24 (estimating 1.5 to 2.3 million living slave laborers).
17 See Stuart Eizenstat, Remarks on Holocaust Survivors (May 12, 1999) (transcript
available at 1999 WL 18310462). Participating countries include the United States,
Germany, Russia, Poland, Czech Republic, Belarus, Ukraine and Israel. Id.
'a See A Slave Labor Settlement, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1999, at 44.
19 See Carol J. Williams, Germany Pledges $5.2 Billion for Slave Laborers; Pact: Joint
State-Industry Compensation Fund Will Shield Companies from Further Lawsuits by Those
Who Were Forced to Work for the Nazis, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1999, at A4.
20 See Marilyn Henry, US and Germany Agree on Terms for 'Legal Peace' on Slave
Labor Claims, JERUSALEM POST, June 14, 2000, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library; see
also German Slave and Forced Labor Settlement, (visited Sept. 23, 2000)
<http://www.cmht.com/gsflsettle.htm>.
21 The Burger-Fischer case involves four class action law suits brought by former slave
laborers against two defendants, Degussa and Siemens. "Degussa is charged with having
refined the gold seized from inmates of the Nazi concentration camps with knowledge of its
source, with use of slave labor and with having manufactured Zyklon B used in the notorious
gas chambers of Auschwitz and other concentration camps. Siemens is charged with having
made extensive use of slave laborers furnished to it by the Nazi regime during World War
II." Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 250. See also Bazyler, supra note 9, 1, at 226 n. 980.
2 Heirs of former slave laborers will not be eligible to receive a distribution from the
compensation fund unless the former laborer was alive as of February 16, 1999. See Cohen,
Milstein, Hansfield & Toll's e-journal, German Slave and Forced Labor Settlement (visited
Oct. 7, 2000) <http://www.cmht.com/gsfsettle.htm>.
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participating industries from any current or future war related legal
claims, 23 thereby rendering the claims of Preis and other plaintiffs moot.
Nonetheless, Burger-Fischer is still a very important case in several
key respects. Until the filing of Holocaust litigation in United States courts,
the industries have been able to deny their use of slave labor and
cooperation with the Nazi regime?5 The filing of the law suits brought the
corporations' atrocities to the attention of the world, thereby pushing
industries to settle claims in order to avoid a plethora of litigation and
continued tarnishing of their corporate images.26
Further, the suits against the German industry sparked companies in
other countries to also confront their past and prompted governmental
action. In July 2000, Austria passed legislation to compensate former slave
laborers through a settlement funded by the Austrian government and
industry.27 Additionally, United States corporations that operated plants in
Nazi Germany are attempting to prevent class action lawsuits by
establishing a compensation fund under the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
U.S. companies that used slave laborers in their German subsidiaries
include Ford, General Motors, Exxon-Mobil and Kodak.
29
Despite these efforts, the court's dismissal of Burger-Fischer
adversely effected holocaust victims. While the filing of litigation may
have encouraged industries to establish a settlement fund, the court's
verdict in favor of the defendant-corporations greatly strengthened the
industries' bargaining power in the international settlement fund
negotiations. 3) Dismissing the case as nonjusticiable set a precedent
rendering it more difficult for future holocaust litigants to prevail in U.S.
courts. With a decreased chance of litigation and adverse judgments,
German industries had less incentive to establish a compensation fund,
23 See A Slave-Labor Settlement, supra note 18, at 44.
24 Because the U.S. judiciary is an independent body the U.S. government cannot
provide the German industry with an ironclad guarantee that participation in the settlement
fund will shield the companies from future litigation in U.S. courts. However, the U.S.
government will make an effort to prevent states from sanctioning the German companies.
Additionally, the German industries and the class action lawyers plan to jointly seek
dismissal of approximately fifty pending lawsuits. See German Industry Faces Up to Past,
Bus. DAY (S. Afr.), Aug. 1, 2000, at 13; see also Henry, supra note 20, at 7.
25 See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 234.
26 See id.
27 See Austrian Slave and Forced Labor Settlement, (visited Aug. 7, 2000)
<http://www.cmht.com/aussettle.htm>.
28 See Joseph Kahn, U.S. Firms Plan Fund for Victims of Nazis, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30,
2000, at 11.
29 See id.
30 See California Suits Target Japanese Corporations for Forced Labor and
Mistreatment of Civilians During World War I1, 16 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 574 (2000).
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especially at a high dollar amount. The precedent that the Burger-Fischer
court creates also renders it more difficult for other uncompensated
Holocaust victims, such as those with slave labor claims against Japanese
manufacturers, to recover.
In dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Degussa and Siemens, the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied
compensation to the victims of one of the worst human rights abuses in
history. This Note details three areas where the court's analysis is flawed.
Section II describes the German industries' use of slave labor during World
War 11, focusing on Siemens. Because the court deemed the postwar
treaties dispositive to the outcome of the case, Section III analyzes the
agreements that have dealt with reparations from the end of the war until
present. This section critiques three justifications for the Burger-Fischer
decision. First, the court misinterpreted the postwar treaties. Second, the
court improperly invoked the political question doctrine. Finally, the
court's alleged inability to calculate damages is inconsistent with prior
practice. Section IV concludes that the Burger-Fischer opinion and the
settlement fund will have an adverse effect on future Holocaust and
international human rights litigation.
II. GERMAN INDUSTRIES' PARTICIPATION IN THE HOLOCAUST
During the Holocaust six million people died and $230-$320 billion
in assets were stolen.31 Although the German government paid more than
$54 billion to Holocaust victims since the postwar period, little if any of
this money has gone to compensate slave laborers. Germany maintains
that it is the responsibility of industries to compensate33 the eight to ten
million people who were employed by private corporations during the
war.M However, companies such as Siemens have stressed that they were
obligated under the Nazi regime to employ slave laborers. Siemens has
stated that the Nazis approached them requesting they employ slave
laborers and that Siemens complied out of fear.35 Therefore, they argue that
it is the responsibility of the German government to provide restitution to
the laborers.
36
31 See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 602.
32 See Burt Herman, WWII Slave Labor Deal Sought, Assoc. PRESS, Aug. 27, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 22038120.
33 See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 613.
34 SeeidL at612.
35 See id. at 613 (describing slave laborers' inability to collect reparations from the
German government or to receive compensation from the industries); see also FERENCZ,
supra note 3, at 120; Marguerite Reardon, Siemens' Haunted History, DATA
COMMUNICATIONS, Aug. 7, 1999, at 53.
36 See Daniel Johnson, Comment: Germany Must Pay the Nazis' Slaves, TiHE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Dec. 7, 1999, at 22 (there are still approximately 2000 firms that
2001]
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Overwhelming evidence reveals that Siemens' assertions are
untrue.37 In fact, Siemens played an active role in designing the slave labor
program.38 Siemens, like many other corporations, cooperated with Hitler's
government in order to maintain an influential status in the German
economy.39 Often companies would arrange meetings with members of the
Nazi government to determine the quantity of a specific good, such as
trucks, tanks, barrels and other equipment needed to fight the war.40 The
company would then make a request for the number of laborers needed to
manufacture the order.4 '
Because the bulk of the German work force fought in the war,
many companies experienced a labor shortage.42 Desperate for laborers,
industries had to use all their influence to persuade the Nazi government for
the privilege of using the concentration camp inmates.4 3 Once the
industries obtained the laborers their objective was to work the people to
death.44 Their only concern was to reap the benefits of the unpaid labor and
position themselves to emerge from the war as a corporate powerhouse in
an otherwise devastated postwar environment.45
contend they were forced to employ slave laborers by the Nazi government and they are not
legally culpable).
37 See generally FERENCZ, supra note 3 (detailing an account of the slave labor program
and the involvement of many of Germany's leading industries).
38 See Reardon, supra note 35, at 55 (stating that three Siemens officials provided this
information through affidavits at Nuremberg).
39 See FERENCZ, supra note 3, at 24; see also CHRISTOPHER SIMPSON, THE SPLENDID
BLOND BEAST: MONEY, LAW AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5 (1995).
40 See Weekend All Things Considered, supra note 4.
41 See id.
42 See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG., 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 263 (D.N.J. 1999).
43 See FERENCZ, supra note 3, at 24. ("An elaborate accounting system was set up to be
sure that the companies paid the SS for every hour of skilled or unskilled labor and that
deductions for the food provided by the companies did not exceed the maximum allowed.
The inmates of course received nothing. They remained under the general control of the SS
but under the immediate supervision of the companies that used them. The companies were
required to see to it that adequate security arrangements, such as auxiliary guards and barbed
wire enclosures, eliminated all possibilities of escape.").
44 See Weekend All Things Considered, supra note 4.
45 See Tamar Hausman, WWII-era Slave Labor Profits Estimated at $95b, JERUSALEM
POST, Nov. 15, 1999, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library. It is estimated that German
banks and industries profited $95 billion by using slave labor during the war. The
Foundation for Social History of the 20th Century came up with this figure after analyzing
the balance sheets of Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Siemens, Allianz, Daimler, and BMW.
HOLOCAUST SLAVE LABOR
Siemens accomplished this objective.46 After decades of denial and
blame shifting, Siemens has paid only nominal amounts to the laborers they
employed. Siemens has paid reparations only twice: once in 1961 and
again in 1998, both of which were token payments amounting to only a
minuscule fraction of their assets. In 1961, Siemens assets were $1 billion
and they paid only $1.8 million in reparations, or 0.18 percent of the
company's value.4 Even worse, in 1998 Siemens' assets totaled $42.3
billion and they paid $11 million in reparations, or 0.03 percent of the
company's value. 8 These payments did not come close to satisfying all
claims and those who did receive money got less than $825 a piece. 9
Because payments have been insufficient and many victims have
not been compensated, former slave laborers have filed lawsuits against
German industries in U.S. courts. One may wonder why these claims are
being brought now.50 First, slave labor survivors, at an average age of 81,
are dying at a rate of ten percent each year.5' If these elderly claimants are
46 Siemens is currently the world's second largest electronics manufacturer. See
FERENcZ, supra note 3, at 117.
47 See Reardon, supra note 35, at 5; see also Hayden, supra note 13, at 11 (stating that
other companies were successful during the war due to their employment of slave labor as
well. For example, BMW quadrupled their profits during WWII by employing slave
laborers from Dachau).
48 See Reardon, supra note 35, at 58.
49 See FERENCZ, supra note 3, at 117-127. Payments from Siemens came as they began
to expand business into the New York market. Head officers of the company felt that a
settlement with the New York Jewish organizations would be better for business. However,
it was not until a document turned up illustrating Siemens' use of slave labor did the
company offer to compensate victims. Even then Siemens maintained the position that they
were forced to use labor from concentration camps and they did what they could to lessen
the victim's suffering. Siemens' has explicitly expressed that the payments made were not
due to "any moral or legal obligation." Id.; see also 60 Minutes: Holocaust Jews As Slave
Labor During WWII and Whether it Compensates for Their Grief or Makes Them Look
Money Hungry (CBS television broadcast, June 27, 1999). A similarly low payment was
made to slave laborers of Volkswagen. In 1980 the company admitted the role they played
in the Holocaust and paid $7 million to Eastern Europe and Jewish charities. However, the
$7 million was not enough. Anna Snopczyk, for example, was forced out of her Poland
home and into the Volkswagen factory where she worked as a slave laborer for four years
making weapons for the war. She received only $400 in compensation. See also CBS News
This Morning: Federal Court Signals Legal Action Against Volkswagen for Atrocities, (CBS
television broadcast, May 5, 1999).
50 Between the end of the war and 1996 only 10 holocaust related lawsuits were filed.
Since 1996, victims have brought more than fifty lawsuits. See Bazyler, supra note 9, at
604-05.
51 See Drozdiak, supra note 16, at A24. Drozdiak estimates that there are between 1.5
and 2.3 million slave laborers still alive. See id. Another source estimates the number
between 700,000 and 1.6 million. See Bazlyer, supra note 9, at 612-13.
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to receive compensation for the suffering they endured, the filing of suits
cannot be delayed.
Second, two cases opened the door for Holocaust related claims to
be brought in U.S. courts. The first was Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,52 a 1980
case that allowed a foreign plaintiff to recover in a U.S. court for human
rights violations committed outside the United States.53 Second, and most
significant, were the class action lawsuits filed in 1996 and 1997 against the
Swiss Banks for withholding assets deposited by Holocaust survivors and
their families prior to the war.54 This litigation resulted in a $1.25 billion
settlement for the victims. 55 Since this settlement, the number of lawsuits
brought by slave labor victims has skyrocketed prompting the initial
settlement fund offer of $1.7 billion from the German Government and
industry in February 1999.56
Finally, political and social changes, primarily in Eastern Europe,
57
have created a more conducive set of circumstances for the filing of
Holocaust related claims. Documents essential to litigating such cases have
just recently become available. The reunification of Germany and the fall
of communism have opened archives providing access to previously hidden
information related to the war58 and have brought to light the active role of
German industries in the slave labor program.
ll1. ANALYSIS OF POSTWAR REPARATION AGREEMENTS
The Burger-Fischer court stated three main factors for granting
summary judgment in favor of the German industries. First, the court
52 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
53 See id. Plaintiffs successfully argued, under the Alien Tort Claims Act, that the former
Inspector General of the police in Paraguay had tortured and killed their son in violation of
the law of nations. See also Bazyler, supra note 9, at 605.
54 See Stephanie A. Bilenker, Comment, In Re Holocaust Victims' Assets Litigation: Do
the U.S. Courts Have Jurisdiction Over the Lawsuits Filed by Holocaust Survivors Against
the Swiss Banks?, 21 MD. J. INT'LL. & TRADE 251 (1997).
55 See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 614 (stating that the Swiss bank litigation encouraged the
filing of law suits against corporations by former slave laborers); see also Verena Dobnick,
Terms Set in Agreement Between Swiss Banks and Holocaust Surivors, Assoc. PRESS, Jan.
23, 1999.
56 See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 196; see also id. at 265-71, for a complete list of United
States Holocaust Litigation including all slave labor claims.
51 See id. at 606.
58 See Bilenker, supra note 54, at 255.
59 See FERENCZ, supra note 3, at 121. It was not until documentation of the atrocities
committed by Siemens were made public that the company offered to compensate victims.
See generally SIMPSON, supra note 39 (illustrating the United States' involvement in
assisting Nazis and German corporate officers who employed slave laborers in their
companies to escape liability, focusing on top United States and German officials and elites).
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concluded that the postwar treaties, specifically the Transition Agreement
and German legislation discussed below, subsumed plaintiffs' claims
against Siemens and Degussa. Next, because the court viewed plaintiffs'
case as a request to reformulate the postwar treaties, the court declined to
adjudicate the case under the political question doctrine. The court stated
that it did not have the power to alter treaties nor was it capable of
calculating a damage award for plaintiffs.
This Note argues that the Burger-Fischer court dismissed plaintiffs'
claims on three erroneous grounds.6 In order to set the stage for these
critical points, Part A will first provide an overview of the reparations
treaties and the historical context in which they were negotiated. Part B
discusses the court's misapplication of standard treaty interpretation
principles and its improper conclusion that the Transition Agreement and
German legislation subsumed all reparation issues. Part C states that the
court improperly applied the political question doctrine to avoid
adjudicating the case. Finally, Part D concludes that the court ignored
precedent in its assertion that it could not calculate damages.
A. Background of Postwar Gennany and Reparations
Treaties
Immediately after the Nazi Army surrendered to the Allies on May
8, 1945, the Allies' primary objective was to ensure that Germany would no
longer be a threat.6 ' The United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet
Union agreed to divide Germany into four shares. 62 Each country was
responsible for demilitarizing and dismantling the industrial capabilities of
63its respective portion of the country. Under the Potsdam Agreement these
nations agreed to seize the industrial equipment and machinery from inside
their occupied zones to satisfy the reparations owed by Germany.
64
In 1946, the United States and seventeen other nations65 met in
Paris to finalize an agreement on the seizure and distribution of
60 This Note addresses three issues the Burger-Fischer court raised in its dismissal of the
case. Because the court found the case nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine
and did not discuss the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, or other issues raised by the
parties, neither will this Note.
61 See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.N.J. 1999), amended by 67 F.
Supp. 2d. 424, 447 (1999).
62 See id. at 447-48.
63 See id
64 See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 265 (D.N.J. 1999).
65 See Ivanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 448 (1999). The nations party to the Agreement on
Reparation from Germany include Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia.
2001]
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66
reparations. The signing of the Paris Reparations Treaty allowed the
signatory nations to obtain a percentage of the total assets collected by the
Western Powers, according to the war-related damages each nation
incurred. 67 The nations agreed that the reparations received would "cover
all its claims and those of its nationals against the former German
Government and its Agencies, 68 of a governmental or private nature arising
out of the war.,
69
However, before the Paris Reparations Treaty could be
implemented, a controversy between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R.
emerged. 70  At the same time, citizens of the nations party to the treaty
began to complain of the high costs of food and other aid being sent to
Germany.7 1 It was expensive for the United States, France and the United
72Kingdom to keep Germany in a collapsed economic state. Fearing that
the seizure of industrial assets from the already bankrupt state would
completely impair Germany's ability to rebuild its economy, 73 the Western
Powers discontinued the reparations program by May of 1946. 74
To assist Germany in rebuilding its economy the Western Powers
began negotiations of the London Debt Agreement 75 and the Transition
66 Agreement on Reparation from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied
Reparation Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold, Jan. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157,
T.I.A.S. 1655 [hereinafter Paris Reparations Treaty].
67 See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (citing Paris Reparations Treaty, pt. I, art. 1.A, pt.
11).
68 "Agencies" has been consistently interpreted to include private corporations that
employed slave laborers. See, e.g., Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 454. The parties in the case
agree that had the Paris Reparations Treaty been implemented plaintiffs' claims would have
been subsumed. See id at 460; see also Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 277. Also note
that the treaty set up a fund to cover those who were stateless at the conclusion of the war
thus their claims would most likely be extinguished as well. See id. at 277.
69 Paris Reparations Treaty, supra note 66, 61 Stat. at 3163, T.I.A.S 1655.
70 See Iwanowa, 67 F.Supp. 2d at 451.
71 See id. at 451.
72 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
73 See id. at 265.
74 See Iwanowa, 67 F.Supp. 2d at 451.
75 See id. at 452-53. Parties to the London Debt Agreement included the Federal
Republic of Germany on one side and Belgium, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, France, Greece,
Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia on the
other. The London Debt Agreement is formally known as the Agreement on German
External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 444, 333 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter London Debt
Agreement].
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Agreement.76 The London Debt Agreement set forth a list of debts owed by
Germany along with a payment schedule. Reparation claims were deferred
under article 5(2), including those of slave laborers against private
industries. 7 The Transition Agreement, a series of agreements negotiated
between 1952 and 1954, also addressed reparations.78 The Transition
Agreement shifted to Germany the responsibility of enacting appropriate
legislation to compensate Nazi victims and to establish a Supreme
Restitution Court to process the claims.79 However, on its face the
Transition Agreement did not purport to resolve all reparation claims, and
the Western Allies agreed that "the problem of reparations shall be settled
by the peace treaty between Germany and its former enemies or by earlier
agreements concerning the matter."
80
On September 12, 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic along with the United States, the United
Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. entered the final peace treaty.81 This
treaty, known as the Two Plus Four Treaty, reunified Germany on March
15, 1991.82 The treaty was silent on the issue of reparations.
B. Postwar Treaty Analysis
Ignoring the basic rules of treaty interpretation, the Burger-Fischer
court concluded that the Transition Agreement and the German legislation
enacted pursuant thereto subsumed plaintiffs' slave labor claims.83 The
court reasoned that because the earlier Potsdam and Paris Agreements
76 The Transition Agreement is a series of agreements negotiated between 1952 and 1954
in Bonn and Paris. Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of
Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 332 U.N.T.S. 219.
77 See Article 5(2) of the London Debt Agreement, stating "Consideration of claims
arising out of the Second World War by countries which were at war with or were occupied
by Germany during that war, and by nationals of such countries, against the Reich [or]
agencies of the Reich...shall be deferred until the final settlement of the problem of
reparations." London Debt Agreement, supra note 75, at art. 5(2); see also Iwanowa, 67
F.Supp. 2d. at 454. The Supreme Court of Germany has ruled that claims against private
industries that employed slave laborers fall under "agencies of the Reich." Id. (citing
Stauder, BGH (1963) at 3). This is supported by the history surrounding negotiations of the
London Debt Agreement.
78 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
79 See id. at 268.
8o Convention (with Annex) on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the
Occupation, May 26, 1952, ch. 6, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 4489, 332 U.N.T.S. 219, 278
[hereinafter Transition Agreement].
81 The Two Plus Four Treaty is officially known as the Treaty on the Final Settlement
with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-20, 29 I.L.M. 1196.
82 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
83 See id. at 278.
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encompassed plaintiffs' claims, the Transition Agreement must have
covered the claims as well. 84 To arrive at this conclusion, the court made
two errors that are discussed below. First, the court misinterpreted the
postwar treaties by disregarding the plain meaning of the language of the
treaties and overlooking the context of the postwar treaty negotiations.
Second, the court ignored the intentions of the signatory nations. Thus, the
court condoned a discriminatory reparations scheme that enriched German
industries at the expense of thousands of innocent slave laborers.
1. Treaty Interpretation
Treaty interpretation follows the general rules of construction
applied to contracts.85 A treaty "is to be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose. 8 6 Thus, a court must
begin by looking to the text and construing the words according to their
literal meaning. A court may not add to or modify a treaty but may look to
extrinsic evidence, such as the historical context and intent of the parties, to
aid in its interpretation. 87  The Burger-Fischer court disregarded all
standard treaty interpretation principles.
The Transition Agreement provides that "the problem of
reparations shall be settled by the peace treaty between Germany and its
former enemies or by earlier agreements governing the matter., 88 This
language, construed in its ordinary meaning clearly states that the
Transition Agreement is not the final word on reparations. No evidence
supports a contrary conclusion. Yet, the Burger-Fischer court reasoned that
because there was no mention of reparations in the final peace treaty,89 the
84 See id.
85 See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 457 (1999) (stating that a treaty
is a contract between nations); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,
446 U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that basic rules of contract
interpretation apply to treaties).
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
325(1) (1987).
87 See lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 457 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392) (stating
that if the treaty's written language is ambiguous the court may rely on extrinsic evidence
and may also look to history to find the parties' intentions).
88 Transition Agreement, supra note 81, ch. 6, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 4489, 332 U.N.T.S.
219,278.
89 See Burger Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 256. Defendants argue that the signatories failed
to mention reparations in the final peace treaty because all claims against Germany and its
nationals had been resolved through the Transition Agreement and bilateral treaties.
However, plaintiffs contend that the Two Plus Four Treaty could not subsume slave labor
claims because they are not reparations claims. Plaintiffs are seeking unjust profits earned
by private industries, which are claims that the Two Plus Four Treaty does not intend to
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Transition Agreement, as the last word on reparations, governs plaintiffs'
claims.90 The court noted that "the Transition Agreement left open the
possibility of further reparation provisions. ' '91 Because the final peace
treaty did not address the reparations issue, the Transition Agreement did
not suddenly subsume all claims, but continued to leave the issue unsettled.
Not only did the Burger-Fischer court erroneously find that the
Transition Agreement governed reparations claims, but the court also
concluded that all private claims, including those of slave laborers, are
subsumed under the Transition Agreement.92 Again disregarding the
standard rules of treaty interpretation, the court asserted that because the
earlier Potsdam and Paris Agreements covered plaintiffs' claims, so too
does the Transition Agreement.93  However, the rules of treaty
interpretation provide that every provision must be given effect, and if there
is an unresolvable conflict between the language of two or more treaties
pertaining to the same subject matter, the latter governs.94 The Transition
Agreement does not provide for the final disposal of reparation claims.
The plaintiffs did not dispute that had the Potsdam or Paris
Reparations Treaty been fully implemented plaintiffs' claims would have
been extinguished.95 The Potsdam Agreement of 1945 and the Paris Treaty
of 1946 aimed to eliminate Germany's capability to wage war by dividing
up the industrial assets among the allied nations. 6 The nations agreed that
the manufacturing equipment they received would serve as reparations for
the Nazi victims, thereby resolving all wartime claims against Germany and
its industries.97 However, as plaintiffs' correctly argue, the London Debt
subsume. To support this argument plaintiffs rely on a ruling by the German Federal
Constitutional Court that found that the Two Plus Four Treaty did not extinguish slave labor
claims. Finally, plaintiffs assert that the treaty could not subsume the claims of stateless
persons because no state had the authority to handle their claims. See also Bazyler, supra
note 9, at 215 (citing three German Court decisions finding private slave labor claims ripe
due to the signing of the Two Plus Four Treaty).
90 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 278-79.
1 Id. at 279.
92 See id. at 278.
93 See id.
94 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 30(3), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
95 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
96 See id. at 265-66.
97 See Paris Reparations Treaty, supra note 66, 61 Stat. at 163, T.I.A.S. 1655, which says
that "[t]he Signatory Governments agree among themselves that their respective shares of
reparation as determined by the present Agreement, shall be regarded by each of them as
covering all its claims and those of its nationals against the former German Government and
its Agencies, of a governmental or private nature, arising out of the war."
2001]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Agreement of 1953 altered this reparations scheme. 98 Mounting tensions
with Russia and pressure from the citizens of allied nations who did not
fancy the idea of shipping food and supplies to Germany caused the
Western Powers to halt the dismantling of German industries in order to
allow Germany to rebuild its economy. Additionally, the Western Powers
set forth a plan to assist Germany in the payment of its debts while
simultaneously allowing the war-torn nation to establish economic
stability. 00 This debt repayment plan is known as the London Debt
Agreement.
The London Debt Agreement deferred war-related claims against
Germany and its nationals until "the final settlement of the problem of
reparations." 10 1 Despite this clear language and the historical context of the
treaty negotiations, the Burger-Fischer court rejected plaintiffs' assertion
that the London Debt Agreement "temporarily relieved German corporate
defendants of the burden of responding to individual claims arising out of
World War II in order to permit them to regain their financial health."'
10 2
The court contended that the London Debt Agreement dealt only with
German debt, not the reparation claims, and was therefore irrelevant to this
case.103 Again the court overlooked the text of the treaty, the historical
context and the intent of the signatories. First, the treaty clearly states in
article 5(2) that claims against "agencies of the Reich...shall be deferred
until the final settlement of the problem of reparations." 104 German courts
have found this language to include claims brought by slave laborers
against private corporate defendants.105 Additionally, history of the treaty
negotiations shows that slave labor claims were discussed in the drafting of
article 5(2) of the London Debt Agreement.'0 6 The court's conclusion is
implausible. Because the Allied nations discontinued their plan to collect
reparations through dismantling of German industries, they purposefully
included a provision preserving and deferring their right to seek reparations
from Germany and its industries until a later date. Any other interpretation
would render article 5(2) meaningless.
98 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
99 See id. at 264-67.
100 See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 452-53 (1999).
1o1 London Debt Agreement, supra note 75, at art. 5(2).
102 Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
103 See id at 277-78.
104 London Debt Agreement, supra note 75, at art. 5(2) (emphasis added).
105 See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 456 (noting that the German Supreme Court which has
construed article 5 of the London Debt Agreement to include a deferral of reparations for
private corporations that used forced labor during the war as well as the claims against the
government).
106 See id. (citing Staucher, BGH[Supreme Court], VI ZR 186/71 at 3 (1963)[F.R.G.]).
[Vol. 33:155
HOLOCAUST SLAVE LABOR
Yet the Burger-Fischer court alleges that this argument, asserted by
the plaintiffs "ignores the Transition Agreement of 1954 which dealt
extensively and definitively with reparations and misconstrues the London
Debt Agreement which dealt primarily, as its name implies, with the
restructuring of German debt."'' 7 First, as stated above, the London Debt
Agreement did refer to reparations and the payment of claims brought by
victims against Germany and its industries. Payments to slave labor victims
were part of the debt owed by Germany and its industry to other nations. If
reparations were not part of the German debt, the Transition Agreement,
which mandates such payments, would never have been enacted. Second,
plaintiffs' argument does not ignore the Transition Agreement. In fact, the
language of the London Debt Agreement that defers reparations is
consistent with a similar provision in the Transition Agreement that states
that final reparation problems will be dealt with in the final peace treaty.
0 8
The rules of treaty interpretation require that two treaties dealing with the
same subject matter be interpreted together unless inconsistencies occur.
Because the London Debt Agreement and the Transition Agreement were
negotiated simultaneously by many of the same nations, they are most
likely intended to be interpreted together.
After taking effect in 1955, the Transition Agreement shifted the
reparations responsibilities to Germany to enact appropriate legislation to
"adequately" compensate Nazi victims. Because the Transition Agreement
contained a provision that deferred the final settlement of reparations until
the final peace treaty, it is in direct conflict with the earlier Potsdam and
Paris Treaty that subsumed all claims. 0 9 Following the rules of treaty
interpretation the court should have concluded that the Transition
Agreement superceded the earlier treaties and that reparation claims were
not covered by the Transition Agreement.
107 Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 277-78.
10 See Transition Agreement, supra note 80, ch. 6, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 4489, 332
U.N.T.S. 219, 278.
109 Yet the Burger-Fischer court believed that just a few short years after the end of the
war the Allied Nations would turn the entire compensation program over to Germany.
While it is clear that Germany was to implement legislation and enact a court to deal with
reparations claims, the Allied Nations purposefully included in the Transition Agreement a
provision that deferred final reparations problems until the final peace treaty. I would argue
that the Allied Nations' purpose for including this provision was to ensure that victims who
fell through the cracks of the German legislation would be compensated at a later time.
Therefore, the slave labor plaintiffs in Burger-Fischer are the perfect example of the class of
victims the deferral of reparations provision was designed to protect.
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2. Intentions of Signatory Nations
The Burger-Fischer court overlooked the intentions of the
signatories manifested in the Transition Agreement as well." 0 The Western
Allies articulated a set of standards for Germany to follow in the
formulation and implementation of the reparations legislation enacted
pursuant to the Transition Agreement."' Germany failed to meet at least
two of these standards.
First, the Allies required that restitution be paid without
discrimination against classes of victims."l 2 However, the Federal Republic
of Germany enacted laws to compensate only victims of stolen property,
financial losses, physical injury, and death.1 3  Politics, prejudicial
sentiments, and inadequate representation left many groups of persecutes,
including slave laborers, without a legal means to collect reparations.
114
The government of Germany had no intention in 1956 of compensating
victims who seek restitution for slave labor performed for private
industries, nor does it today. 15 When victims sought compensation under
the Transition Agreement from the German government, their claims were
rejected under the London Debt Agreement, which deferred reparations
until the final peace treaty.
116
Second, the Transition Agreement required Germany to implement
a reparations scheme that recognized the difficulties Nazi victims would
110 The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the intent of the parties in
treaty interpretation. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,
41 U.C.L.A. LAW REV. 953, 966 (1994) (citing Maximov v. U.S., 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)
(emphasizing that "[tihe treaty's text does not control if application of the words of the
treaty according [to] their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or
expectations of its signatories")).
11 See Transition Agreement, supra note 80, pt. IV, art. 16, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 4550, 332
U.N.T.S. 219, 328.
112 See id.
113 See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 270 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that
German laws enacted pursuant to the Transition Agreement provide compensation only for
"death, physical injury, property damage, financial loss and loss caused to professional or
economic life. Slave or forced labor was not an injury for which compensation could be
sought per se.").
114 See CHRISTIAN PROSS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE STRUGGLE OVER REPARATIONS FOR
SURVIVING VICTIMS OF THE NAzI TERROR 52 (Belinda Cooper trans., 1998). Other groups
left without compensation under the German legislation were those who were persecuted
outside Germany and didn't meet the residency requirements, victims of sterilization,
communists, Gypsies, and homosexuals. Id.
115 See What It Was Like to be a Forced Laborer According to German Negotiators
(visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.cmht.com/slave labor/czechpole2.htm>.
116 See PROSS, supra note 114, at 52.
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have in obtaining evidence." 7 The German government also violated this
standard. Instead of considering the evidentiary difficulties the victims may
have, Germany designed reparations laws which gave the officials a
plethora of excuses to deny and postpone victims' claims.118 With many
former Nazi officials in charge of the reparations programs," 9 the
restitution laws and administration were implemented to frustrate
claimants. 120  The laws were unduly complex containing countless
provisions, "grounds for exclusion, deadlines, and harassing demands" to
create a system in which settlements were minimized.'12  For example, one
section provides that anyone who "purposely or negligently provides
incorrect or misleading information" regarding injuries suffered will not
receive reparations.122 This provision applied to even minor mistakes of
information. "Because many victims could no longer remember dates and
times, and few documents remained available, they became entangled in
contradictions. If officials were able to find contradictions[,] ... they were
refused reparations. ' ' 23
Despite these deficiencies in the implementation of the Transition
Agreement, the Burger-Fischer court found that if any remedy was
available to the plaintiffs, relief was to be sought under the Transition
Agreement and subsequent German legislation. 24 In other words, the court
stated that under the terms of the treaty, the victims' only channel for
recovery lay under the German legislation, even though it was inadequate to
this end. The court stated that despite some "gaps" in the German
legislation, the "substance of reparations" was included in the Transition
Agreement and Germany fulfilled their duties by enacting the required
legislation. 125 The court thereby legitimized a system of reparations that
fails to acknowledge the moral obligation owed by Germany r 6 to the Nazi
117 See Transition Agreement, supra note 80, pt. IV, art. 16, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 4550, 332
U.N.T.S. 219, 328. Due to the war, documents were lost and witnesses disappeared; thus,
the allied nations intended Germany to implement a compensation program that took such
evidentiary problems into account.
118 See PROSS, supra note 114, at45.
119 See id. at 18.
120 See id. at 175-76.
121 Id
122 Id. at 56.
123 id.
124 See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 278 (D.NJ. 1999).
12 Id. at 279.
126 See PROSS, supra note 114, at 16. Reparations were seen as important by very few in
Germany. A few politicians, lawyers, journalists and scholars shared the opinion that
victims of the Holocaust, including slave laborers, should be compensated. In reality, the
most avid opponent of reparations, the Finance Ministry, was in charge of the legislation.
The Finance Ministry viewed reparations as the price to pay for the U.S. to accept the
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victims and directs plaintiffs to seek relief under laws that do not
compensate slave laborers.
C. Political Question Doctrine
The second erroneous basis for dismissal in Burger-Fischer was the
court's reliance on the political question doctrine.127 Under the political
question doctrine, the judicial branch is constrained from reviewing certain
issues that the political branches of government control. 128 Many scholars
criticize the political question doctrine because its wholly discretionary
nature allows courts to avoid deciding important legal matters. 129
The Burger-Fischer court found plaintiffs' case nonjusticiable
because the legal issues raised foreign policy questions that had been
allocated to the President under the Constitution. 30  Proclaiming an
inability to adjudicate the adequacy of the reparations provided under the
postwar treaties, the Court cited two outdated cases from the first half of the
twentieth century to support its position that a court has no role in the
examination of foreign affairs.
131
However, more recent case law demonstrates that the judiciary does
have the power to interpret treaties and render decisions that may affect the
political branches' actions in the international arena.13 2  In 1986, the
Federal Republic of Germany in the community of Western Nations and for the world's
Jewish population to "accept the German economy and its products as participants in world
trade." Id. In fact, the attitude of Germany's top officials in the early 1960's was that the
postwar period was over, limitations of filing of claims would not be extended, and the Nazi
crimes would not be used as political pawns forever.
127 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 282-85.
128 See David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions,
70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1439, 1442-43 (1999).
129 See id.; see also Paul Hoffman et al., Panel III: War Crimes and Other Human Rights
Abuses in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 WHITH[ER L. REv. 433 (1995) (analyzing doctrines of
avoidance such as the political question doctrine). Scholars also argue that the political
question doctrine is unnecessary since the Constitution allocates the power between the
branches and that courts should abstain from deciding cases that they are Constitutionally
forbidden to decide. See also Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85
YALE L.J. 597-98 (1976); David J. Bederman, Book Review, 7 EMORY INT'L LAW REV. 693,
698 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLMCAL QUESTrONS/JUDICiAL ANSWERS:
DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS?).
130 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83.
131 See id. at 283 (citing Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Watermann S.S. Corp, 333 U.S.
103 (1948) and U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
132 The Alien Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), and the Torture Victim
Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), are examples of Congress intending courts to hear
international law cases. See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 248-50 (2d Cir. 1995)
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Supreme Court articulated that "courts have the power to construe
treaties 133 and executive agreements . . . and we cannot shirk this
responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political
overtones." 134
Reasoning that the undoing of the reparations scheme authorized by
the Executive Department and Senate would be an embarrassment to the
political branches, the Burger-Fischer court dismissed the case.135 Yet with
the Executive Branch engaged in negotiations with the defendants and
several other German corporations to set up a settlement fund to
compensate slave laborers, a finding adverse to defendants would have
aided the Executive Branch's position in the negotiations. Instead, the
Burger-Fischer court established a precedent and sent the message to
German industries that they could not be held liable in U.S. courts, thereby
decreasing German corporations' incentive to reach an agreement to
establish a compensation fund. Furthermore, the Executive Branch was
aware of the Burger-Fischer litigation and would have made its concerns
known to the court had the case concerned significant foreign policy
relations. 36
The preeminent case relating to the political question doctrine, and
cited by the Burger-Fischer court is Baker v. Carr.' Baker v. Carr sets
forth a six-factor test that courts apply to determine whether to invoke the
political question doctrine. 138 The six factors include: (1) Constitutional
commitment of the issue to another branch of government; (2) lack of
respect to the coordinate branches of government; (3) potential for
embarrassment for multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question; (4) lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for deciding issues; (5) impossible to resolve without "an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion," and; (6) an
"unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
(failing to invoke the political question doctrine to dismiss action brought against Bosnian
Serb leader under the Alien Tort Claims Act even though the issue affects foreign policy).
133 See generally Bederman, supra note 110, at 957. The Constitution does not regulate
thejudiciary's interpretation of treaties.
134 Bederman, supra note 128, at 1444-45 (quoting Japan Waling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)).
135 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. at 284-85.
136 See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 231.
137 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
138 See id. at 217.
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made.', 139 The court concluded that all six factors were satisfied in the
present case, but failed to provide a coherent analysis of the factors.14
0
Instead of applying the Baker v. Carr test to the facts of the Burger-
Fischer case in a logical fashion, the court drew the sweeping conclusion
that it was being asked to reformulate the entire set of postwar treaties. In
justifying the application of the political question doctrine, the Burger-
Fischer court thereby wrongly classified plaintiffs' case as one against a
major portion of Germany's industry, citing over forty companies that
potentially employed slave laborers.
Plaintiffs correctly defined their case as private parties suing
private industries; 4 1 former slave laborers seeking compensation from the
companies they were forced to work for and restitution for the unjust
enrichment that fell to defendants as a result of their unpaid labor.
However, the Burger-Fischer court found the case to be a public law claim
due to the enormous financial effect that a judgment, adverse to the
defendants, would have on the German economy. Going beyond the
scope of the case before it and speculating about potential future law suits,
the court found that many of the largest German corporations employed "a
substantial portion of the industrial slave laborers" and that to hold
defendants liable "in the aggregate" would allow other slave laborers to
recover from other German corporations which would adversely affect the
entire German economy. 43 However, neither the state of the German
economy nor the ability of potential future defendants to satisfy adverse
judgments should have been a concern of this court. By redefining
plaintiffs' case as one affecting the entire German economy rather than
focusing on the parties before it, the court found the case nonjusticiable
under the political question doctrine.
D. Damages
Third, the Burger-Fischer court erroneously declined to adjudicate
this case because of an alleged inability to calculate damages due to lack of
an applicable standard. 44 The court could not determine a compensation
formula that would fairly provide reparations for all those who have claims
against German industries."45 Again, the court looked past the parties in
this case and questioned how one court could divide the German assets
139 Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 282. If a case fails only one of the six factors the
political question doctrine should be invoked.
140 See id.; see also Bazyler, supra note 9, at 229.
141 See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
'42 See id. at 281-82.
141 Id. at 282.
'44 See id. at 284.
145 See id.
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among all those who deserve reparations. 46 However, the court posed the
wrong question. The Burger-Fischer court should have asked how a
reparations formula could be devised to award these plaintiffs
compensation and whether there was precedent to guide that decision. If
the court had focused on the parties in this case instead of trying to
reformulate the entire series of postwar treaty negotiations and reparation
agreements, the court's task would have been much less arduous.
To compensate the plaintiffs the court could have devised a basic
formula to pay the laborers for the amount of time they worked. By simply
multiplying the number of hours worked by the standard rate of pay for the
type of labor performed during the relevant time period and adding on
interest, the court could have reduced the unjust benefit that defendants
received from the atrocities they committed. In its discretion the court could
have also chosen to add on additional punitive damages for the abuses
suffered by the plaintiffs, including the detestable working and living
conditions they were forced to endure.
The Burger-Fischer court's assertion that it had no standard to
apply to compensate plaintiffs is unfounded. Calculating damages in
international human rights cases is comparable to calculating damages in
any other case.' 47 If plaintiffs provided enough evidence of their injuries
and established the liability of the defendants for causing such injuries, it is
the court's duty to devise a reasonable compensation scheme so that
plaintiffs are appropriately remedied and defendants are not unjustly
enriched. Furthermore, United States federal courts in the Swiss and
Austrian banking litigation stepped up to the challenge of determining a just
allocation of damages for victims and their heirs.
148
The Burger-Fischer court could have followed the approach taken
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala."'9 In Filartiga, a Paraguayan government agent
tortured the son of the plaintiffs, who brought an action in the Second
Circuit under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 50 To determine damages the
146 See id
"47 See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
IN U.S. CourTs 213 (1996).
148 See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 230 (stating that in addition to allocating damages in the
Holocaust banking cases, U.S. courts have "repeatedly undertake[n] similar tasks, ranging
from complex multidistrict litigation cases involving airline crashes or securities fraud, to
wide-ranging products liability class action lawsuits involving tobacco, drugs, or other
consumer products"); see also, Swiss Bank Settlement (visited Aug. 7, 2000)
<http:llwww.cmht.comlcasewatchlcases/sbsettle.htm> (stating that the judge in the Swiss
Bank settlement examined statements offered by potential class members and held fairness
hearings to find the $1.25 billion settlement fair and equitable. Additionally, the judge
appointed a special master to develop a plan for distributing the money to the victims).
149 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
150 See id.
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Second Circuit applied choice of law principles focusing on the place where
the relationship between the parties was centered. 15' Finding that
Paraguayan law did not provide an adequate remedy because it did not
allow for punitive damages the Filartiga court provided a remedy that
fulfilled the international community's objection to torture. 52 Because a
violation of international law is an offense to all humanity, the trial court
awarded the Filartiga family $10 million' 53 in punitive damages, stating that
punitive damages must be awarded in an amount that will deter others from
committing such outrageous crimes against humanity.'
54
The Burger-Fischer court acknowledged that defendants violated
customary international law;1 55 thus, the court should have followed the
compensation scheme set forth in Filartiga to provide plaintiffs with some
form of relief. While there is little to guide courts on what constitutes a
reasonable damage award, many courts have faced this challenge and have
compensated victims of international human rights violations by awarding
them millions, and occasionally even billions of dollars. 156 The dismissal of
plaintiffs' case on the basis of the postwar treaties, the political question
doctrine or an alleged inability to calculate damages was improper. The
court should have found that the Transition Agreement governed but did
not subsume plaintiffs' slave labor claims. Because the Transition
Agreement provides the last word on war reparations by deferring final
reparation issues until a peace treaty is signed, victims' claims against
German private industries are still alive since the final treaty did not
mention reparation issues. Plaintiffs' claims were not subsumed by the
Transition Agreement as the Burger-Fischer court decided. The German
legislation enacted pursuant to the Transition Agreement intentionally
excluded slave labor claims because the German government viewed the
claims as a responsibility of the corporations. By dismissing the case, the
court condoned Germany's inadequate and discriminatory legislation and
allowed defendants to entirely escape responsibility for their wartime
atrocities.
The Burger-Fischer court also should have rejected the
applicability of the political question doctrine to this case. One reason to
invoke the doctrine is to avoid embarrassing the executive branch through a
decision adverse to international negotiations. In this case, by applying the
151 See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 147, at 211-13.
152 See id.
153 Exact damage award is $10,385,364. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 147, at
344.
154 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
155 See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D.N.J. 1999).
156 See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 147, at 343-48 (providing a more detailed list of
damage awards in eleven human rights cases, including Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162 (D. Mass. 1995)).
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political question doctrine the court did exactly what it sought to avoid.
During a course of critical negotiations to establish a settlement fund for
slave laborers between the German industries and the U.S. Government, the
District Court of New Jersey held that German corporations could not be
held liable in U.S. courts, thus weakening the bargaining position of the
United States.
Finally, the court incorrectly declined to calculate damages for the
plaintiffs by viewing the case as a complex issue of war reparations
involving sophisticated government-to-government negotiations. Instead,
the court should have looked at this case as a severe human rights abuse for
which victims have gone uncompensated under the applicable postwar
treaties, while defendants profited by forcing plaintiffs to toil under brutal
and inhumane conditions. Turning to precedent from other human rights
cases or simply multiplying out the amount of back pay plus interest, the
court could have arrived at a judgment for the plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A dismissal in the Burger-Fischer case not only affects Zelig Preis
and the class he represents, but also makes outstanding claims of other
Holocaust victims more difficult to litigate. Although a settlement fund has
been established for slave labor victims of German industries, there are at
least 313 Austrian companies that exploited Polish slave laborers, 57 and the
"entire Japanese manufacturing, shipping, mining, steel and construction
industries" have been sued by prisoners of war and civilians who were
forced to labor for Japanese firms. 5 8 Additional suits have been brought
against European banks and insurance companies for profiting from
wartime dormant accounts and policies.1 59 The Burger-Fischer decision
will more than likely have an adverse effect on Holocaust victims in future
cases as well.
One may presume that although the Burger-Fischer court dismissed
plaintiffs' case, the slave labor victims will not go uncompensated. The
$4.8 billion settlement fund will punish the companies and provide
plaintiffs with the restitution they seek. Or will it? With the industries
responsible for only half of the fund160 and over 3,000 firms contributing,16 1
157 See Austrian Companies Exploited Forced Laborers (visited Sept. 23, 2000)
<http://www.cmht.com/slave_labor/ausco.htm>.
158 California Suits Target Japanese Corporations, supra note 30, at 575.
159 See A Slave-Labour Settlement, supra note 18, at 44.
160 See Stuart Eizenstat, The Healing Power of Truth: Germany is Setting the Right
Example by Confronting its Past Horrors Through its Holocaust Compensation, FINANciAL
TIMES (LoNDoN), Jan. 11, 2000 at 17, available in LEXIS, News Library.
161 See Marilyn Henry, Germany Said Ignoring Terms of Slave-Labor Deal, JERUSALEM
POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library.
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the amount each will pay will be a nominal amount in proportion to their
total assets. Many former forced laborers argue that their expected payment
of less than $5,000 each 162 is too little too late.163 They want the German
industry to "acknowledge its moral responsibility," and they feel that "a
generous settlement is part, but only part, of that."'6 Slave laborers feel
that instead of an apology they have been "offered a paltry sum" of money
which "firms [can] offset . . . against tax and end up hardly out of
pocket."'
165
No amount of money can make the Holocaust victims "whole," but
money is not what most victims seek. 166 Slave laborers want the German
industries to acknowledge their wartime atrocities and apologize.
67
Unfortunately the settlement fund does not mandate industries to express
any moral wrongdoing. In reality, most German and U.S. companies are
joining the fund to buy protection from future lawsuits and to shield
themselves from negative publicity regarding their participation with the
Nazi regime. 168 During negotiations for the fund corporate representatives
and government officials expressed sentiments such as "[w]e don't care
how many survivors there are or how much they get.. .we only care about
how much we have to pay"'169 and "[w]e don't understand what all of this
fuss is about; we fed them, we clothed them, we sheltered them, and the
fact that they survived is a testament to how well they were treated."'
' 70
Given the pervasiveness of sentiments such as these, it is unlikely that
Holocaust victims or their heirs will ever receive the apology or justice they
deserve.
162 See A Slave Labour Settlement, supra note 18, at 44.
163 See id.; see also Hayden, supra note 13, at 11.
164 Johnson, supra note 36, at 22.
165 Id.; but see German Industry Faces Up to Past, supra note 24 (stating that the
establishment of the compensation fund reflects a "moral responsibility" owed by German
industry and while not a lot of money, is a respectable amount especially for persons in
Eastern Europe).
166 Johnson, supra note 36, at 22.
167 See id.
168 See Hayden, supra note 13, at 11.
169 Id. (quoting a Deutsche Bank official).
170 Cohen, Milstein, Hansfield & Toll's e-journal, Czechoslovakian and Polish Forced
Laborers (visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.cmht.com/slave-labor/czechpole.htm>.
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